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Even as they prospered financially, Amsterdam’s thriving community of
“Portuguese” merchants were burdened by the mandate imposed by the city’s
regents in 1619 when they granted these ex-converso refugees from Iberia the right
to openly practice their Judaism. The Dutch authorities expected them to regulate
the social, moral, and religious life of their community and to ensure that it kept
to a strict observance of Jewish law. This led the community to be especially
sensitive to the concerns of their Christian neighbors. The famous toleration of the
Dutch could never be taken for granted and the Jewish community was aware of
the many political and theological divisions within their host community that
constantly threatened to upset the delicate balance supporting continued toleration. Furthermore, after generations of practicing Judaism in secret, the
community had but a tenuous grasp of their religious identity and needed to
rediscover or even reinvent central religious practice. This sense of insecurity
arising from the perceived precariousness of their place in the city led them to
reinstate the practice of expelling “heretics” from the community. The issuance of
writs of herem, or expulsion, became common and took on a political as well as a
religious dimension.
On 27 July 1656 the community issued an unusually harsh herem to twentythree-year-old Baruch Spinoza, who had recently taken over his family’s importing
concerns. They accused him of “monstrous deeds” and of practicing and teaching
“abominable heresies,” researching carefully older writs to find the harshest and
most colorful formulations. Young Spinoza had as yet published nothing and the
writ of expulsion gives no clue as to the precise nature of these deeds and heresies.
Steven Nadler, in this sequel to his fine biography (Spinoza: A Life [1999]) addresses this mystery. The task is doubly difficult. In the absence of any
documentary “smoking gun” and given that any number of Spinoza’s later published doctrines (for example, his denial of the divine origin of the Torah) would
have been cause enough, establishing “the cause” of his expulsion is, according to
Nadler, a bit like finding the cause of the French Revolution. Yet here the historian
faces the “supreme gift,” a situation of “overdetermination,” and is free to pursue
interesting subplots (15). Based on some hints in the documentary record, Nadler
chooses a particularly fascinating, if controversial, subplot, Spinoza’s views on the
eternity of mind and his apparent denial of personal immortality. This then
becomes the occasion for a detailed discussion of Spinoza’s philosophy, Jewish
theology, and the views of the great Jewish Aristotelians concerning the nature of
mind and intellect.
That Spinoza in his mature writings rejected any notion of an individual mind
or soul as a distinct, independent substance is clear. This rejection of the Cartesian
basis for immortality is a central component of his monism. Yet many have seen
in his cryptic remarks concerning the eternity of the mind some basis for a version
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of personal immortality. Even after the destruction of the body, Spinoza writes,
there is something of the human mind that remains and is eternal. The question
is whether this “something” is enough to secure personal immortality. The heart
of Nadler’s book is a persuasive argument that these remarks in fact constitute a
denial of immortality. Nadler demonstrates that Spinoza is developing the views of
Maimonides and especially Gersonides and presents an interpretation on which
Spinoza’s philosophy of mind constitutes “the culmination of Jewish rationalism.”
In rejecting any version of individual immortality, offering instead a vision of a
single, divine eternal intellect, Spinoza can be seen as “pushing a particular intellectualist account of the mind to its ultimate logical conclusion” (131).
Concerned that their Christian hosts would take offense if the community
accepted someone who seemed to undermine morality by removing the support of
eternal reward and punishment, hoping that their cousins in Portugal would,
despite their outward rejection of Judaism, still have a share in the world to come
and, most importantly, committed to a version of Judaism still colored in various
ways by Catholicism, the Amsterdam community expelled the young heretic with
prejudice. Nadler has not settled the question of Spinoza’s expulsion, but his
well-researched exploration of this aspect of the story will fascinate anyone interested in Jewish thought or early modern philosophy.
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